

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 175027

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 175027 ACTION CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
BEIRUT AMMAN JERUSALEM JIDDA KUWAIT, SEPTEMBER 1ST:

QUOTE

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FOLLOWING SENT SECSTATE, AUGUST 31, FROM TEL AVIV RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE SECRET TEL AVIV 6898

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS

SUBJECT: WALDHEIM VISIT

1. SUMMARY. MRS MEIR STATED THAT WALDHEIM "BROUGHT NOTHING"
TO ISRAEL. SYRIANS DEMANDED GOI WITHDRAWAL FROM GOLAN HGTS
BEFORE EVEN CONSIDERING NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THEY DID
NOT ACCEPT RES 242. LEBANESE WERE TOO WEAK TO BE USEFUL IN
INITIATING NEGOTIATING PROCESS, AS WERE JORDANIANS. WALDHEIM
SUGGESTED POSSIBLE GOI INITIATIVE INDICATING WILLINGNESS NEGOTIATE
ON BASIS UN CHARTER. MRS MEIR REJECTED SUGGESTION AND INSISTED
242 BE USED AS BASIS FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS. GOI ALSO FIRMLY
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REJECTED WALDHEIM SUGGESTION INTERIM AGREEMENT IDEA MIGHT BE
RESURRECTED IF GOI WERE WILLING TO "IMPLY" THAT IT WILLING GO
BACK TO 1967 BORDERS. MRS MEIR REITERATED GOI WILLINGNESS
ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON BASIS 242 AND REJECTION ANY SUGGESTION OF

PRE-NEGOTIATION COMMITMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 BORDERS. MRS MEIR SPELLED OUT GOI WILLINGNESS HAVE UN - OR ANYONE ELSE - TRY GET PARTIES TOGETHER, BUT REJECTS MEDIATION. PROBLEM AS SEEN BY MRS MEIR IS TO GET ARAB LEADERS TO ACCEPT EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, RATHER THAN INDULGE IN SEMANTICS DESIGNED TO COVER AIM OF ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION. MRS MEIR IN FINE FORM AND HOUR LONG CONVERSATION MARKED BY CANDOR AND CORDIALITY. END SUMMARY.

2. I PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON PRIMIN MEIR THIS MORNING. DCM ACCOMPANIED. ALSO PRESENT WERE MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN PRIMIN'S OFFICE, AND AVIGDOR SHOHAM, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL.

3. EARLY IN CONVERSATION I RAISED SUBJECT OF WALDHEIM VISIT, NOTING USG WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN HER VIEWS. MRS MEIR WAS MOST WILLING TO SPEAK ABOUT HER CONVERSATIONS WITH WALDHEIM AND RELATED MATTERS AND THIS DOMINATED MOST OF OUR HOUR LONG CONVERSATION (PART DEVOTED TO ICAO SENT SEPTTEL).

4. MRS MEIR LED OFF BY STATING THAT WALDHEIM "BROUGHT NOTHING". WALDHEIM THOUGHT FACT SYRIANS EVEN LET HIM COME TO DAMASCUS WAS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE, BUT FROM GOI POINT OF VIEW RESULTS WERE NIL. ASSAD REPORTEDLY REMINDED WALDHEIM THAT SYRIA DID NOT ACCEPT RES 242. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION FROM WALDHEIM, ASSAD SAID NO QUESTION OF SYRIA CONSIDERING DEALING WITH ISRAEL IN ANY WAY UNTIL GOLAN HEIGHTS ENTIRELY RETURNED TO SYRIA. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE TOLD WALDHEIM IT WAS UNFORTUNATE HE DIDN'T ASK THE SYRIANS KEY QUESTION: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER ISRAEL LET SYRIANS BACK INTO HEIGHTS? WOULD THERE BE PEACE OR NEGOTIATIONS? WALDHEIM HAD TO ADMIT HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH ASSAD. MRS MEIR SAID ISRAELIS, UNFORTUNATELY, KNOW ANSWER AND NO GOVERNMENT WORTHY OF THE NAME WILL ALLOW SYRIANS TO REPEAT PRACTICE OF 19 YEARS PRIOR TO 1967 OF SHOOTING DOWN INNOCENT FARMERS.

5. RE WALDHEIM'S VISIT TO LEBANON, MRS MEIR VIRTUALLY DISMISSED IT BY NOTING GOL EVIDENTLY WEPT ON HIS SHOULDERS AND EMPHASIZED LEBANON'S HELPLESSNESS. SHE RECOGNIZED THAT GOL
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WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL WITH NO PRECONDITIONS, BUT LEBANON, LIKE JORDAN (PARA 8) WAS TOO WEAK TO ACT ALONE OR BE FIRST.

6. NEXT STOP FOR WALDHEIM, SAID MRS MEIR, WAS "BIG BOSS" (SADAT) IN EGYPT. WALDHEIM RAISED POSSIBILITY WITH PRIMIN THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RESURRECT IDEA OF INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH GOI GIVING IMPLIED COMMITMENT TO EVENTUALLY GO BACK TO 1967 LINES, IN CONTEXT NOTING INTERIM BOUNDARIES NOT FINAL. MRS MEIR TURNED THIS DOWN AND STATED THAT AS LONG AS EGYPTIANS INSIST ON GOI COMMITMENT OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS NO HOPE. IN THIS RESPECT, SHE REVIEWED FOR ME RECORD OF SADAT INITIATIVE RE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN 1971, NOTING

THAT IN "PAPER" GOI SENT TO US, IT WAS CLEAR THAT INTERIM BOUNDARIES WERE NOT CONSIDERED FINAL BY ISRAEL, BUT THAT FINAL BOUNDARIES WOULD BE NEGOTIATED.

7. MRS MEIR SAID SHE SUGGESTED THAT WALDHEIM ASK SADAT FOLLOWING QUESTION: IF GOI WILLING TO GO BACK TO 1967 BORDERS, WOULD SADAT BE WILLING TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH GOI ALONG LINES OF RELATIONS THAT EXIST BETWEEN FRG AND FRANCE, OR EVEN FRG AND POLAND? SHE NOTED THAT SADAT'S ANSWER IN PAST HAS ALWAYS BEEN "NEVER, NEVER." MRS MEIR NOTED THAT EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN MOTIVES IN TRYING TO PUSH GOI BACK TO 1967 BORDERS WERE CLEAR: THIS WOULD BE FIRST STEP IN PLAN TO DESTROY ISRAEL. SHE REFERRED TO AN ARTICLE BY HAYKEL WITHIN PAST SIX MONTHS WHICH CLEARLY SPELLED THIS OUT PUBLICLY.

8. DIGRESSING A BIT, MRS MEIR PRAISED KING HUSSEIN FOR HIS COURAGE AND NOTED HE HAS PUBLICLY STATED WAR IS NOT THE ANSWER. SHE REFERRED TO HIS FOOLISH ACTIONS IN INITIATING HOSTILITIES IN JUNE 1967 DESPITE ASSURANCES FROM PRIMIN ESHKOL GOI WOULD NOT ATTACK HIM. ALTHOUGH SHE RECOGNIZED HUSSEIN WAS DUPED BY NASSER AT THE TIME, AND SHE HAD CERTAIN ADMIRATION FOR HIM, MRS MEIR STATED HE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO BE FIRST TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND HE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY PUBLICLY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS IN JUNE 1967 (ASSUME THIS REFERS TO PERMANENT LOSS OF EAST JERUSALEM, AT MINIMUM). IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, MRS MEIR REPLIED THAT HUSSEIN WOULD BE WILLING ENTER NEGOTIATION WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. HE COULD NOT DO IT ALONE, NOR BE FIRST. SHE NOTED EVEN BOURGUIBA SUGGESTED
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CARVING UP HUSSEIN'S KINGDOM.

9. I ASKED HER IF WALDHEIM SUGGESTED ANY NEW APPROACHES. MRS MEIR REPLIED THAT ONLY NEW ELEMENT WAS WALDHEIM'S SUGGESTION- MOTIVATED AT LEAST IN PART BY NEGATIVE SYRIAN ATTITUDE ON RES 242 - THAT GOI BE WILLING TO SAY THAT ISRAEL READY ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON UN CHARTER. SHE REPLIED THAT RES 242 WAS CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED, AND SHOULD BE USED AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SHE ADDED THAT UN CHARTER PROPOSAL WOULD TURN INTO PROLONGED SEMANTICS HASSLE THAT COULD GO ON FOR "20 YEARS." IN BRIEF, MRS MEIR DID NOT ENCOURAGE WALDHEIM TO STRAY FROM RES 242 IN CAIRO.

10. I ASKED HMR IF SHE COULD FORESEE ANY USEFUL ROLE FOR THE UN. MRS MEIR REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS HAPPY TO HAVE UN - OR ANYONE ELSE - TRY TO PLAY USEFUL ROLE IN GETTING ISRAEL AND THE ARABS AROUND NEGOTIATING TABLE, BUT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT ANY ATTEMPT AT MEDIATION, AND SHE DESCRIBED JARRING MEMO OF FEB 1971 AS "CALAMITY." SHE EMPHASIZED THAT ONLY HOPE WAS FOR ARAB LEADERS TO BE CONVINCED THAT THEY COULD ONLY SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL BY DEALING WITH GOI.

11. TO EMPHASIZE MAJOR THRUSTS OF HER CONCERNS RE ATTITUDES OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS, MRS MEIR RELATED FOLLOWING STORY: AT REQUEST OF EUROPEAN FRIEND, SHE AGREED ABOUT 3 MONTHS AGO TO MEET WITH "INTELLIGENT ARAB." (DESPITE GENTLE PRODDING FROM ME, MRS MEIR WOULD NOT REVEAL MORE DETAILS AS TO ARAB INVOLVED, EXCEPT TO SAY IT WAS NOT HUSSEIN.) DURING COURSE OF FRANK DISCUSSION, SHE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED "IF YOU WON THE WAR IN 1967?" HE REPLIED "THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE END OF ISRAEL." MRS MEIR THEN ASKED "WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED TO THE JEWS?" THE ARAB DID NOT ANSWER. MRS MEIR NOTED THAT IS THE QUESTION THE GOI HAS TO FOCUS ON.

12. COMMENT: WHEN I LEFT PRIMIN'S OFFICE, GAZIT TOLD ME GOI WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO US TRANSCRIPT OF WALDHEIM/MEIR DISCUSSIONS. MY DCM HAS BEEN INVITED TO JERUSALEM ON SUNDAY TO BE BRIEFED BY MFA ON WALDHEIM/EBAN DISCUSSIONS. IF TRANSCRIPT AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, WE WILL FORWARD IT AT ONCE. APART FROM WHAT PROGRESS - OR LACK THEREOF - MAY RESULT FROM WALDHEIM VISIT, HE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED HERE.

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UNFORTUNATELY, HE COMMITTED A COUPLE OF INCREDIBLE PUBLIC BOO BOOS (JERUSALEM 4427) WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN UNFORTUNATE PUBLICITY, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT UN DOESN'T NEED HERE. KEATING UNQUOTE. ROGERS

UNQUOTE ROGERS

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